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Abstract
Boneh and Venkatesan have recently proposed an approach to proving that a reasonably
small portions of most signiﬁcant bits of the Difﬁe–Hellman key modulo a prime are as secure
as the whole key. Some further improvements and generalizations have been obtained by
Gonzales Vasco and Shparlinski. Verheul has obtained certain analogies of these results in the
case of Difﬁe–Hellman keys in extensions of ﬁnite ﬁelds, when an oracle is given to compute a
certain polynomial function of the key, for example, the trace in the background ﬁeld. Here we
obtain a new result in this direction concerning the case of so-called ‘‘unreliable’’ oracles. The
result has applications to the security of the recently proposed by Lenstra and Verheul XTR
cryptosystem.
r 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Let Fq denote a ﬁnite ﬁeld of q elements.
Boneh and Venkatesan [1] have proposed an approach to proving that about n1=2
of most signiﬁcant bits of the Difﬁe–Hellman key modulo an n-bit prime p are
‘as secure as the whole key derived from the Difﬁe–Hellman key exchange protocol
over Fp:
Their results have been generalized to the Difﬁe–Hellman scheme in subgroups of
Fp (and slightly corrected) by M. I. Gonzales Vasco and I. Shparlinski [8,9]. Several
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results of these papers have recently been improved in
* [7], where the so-called noisy oracles are considered;
* [21], where a modiﬁcation of the previously used algorithm is given which allows
us to study very small subgroups (including all subgroups of Fp of cryptogra-
phically interesting sizes).
It is interesting to remark that [21] some links between this problem and the Waring
problem in ﬁnite ﬁelds are exhibited.
The underlying motivation of these results is that at the end of execution of the Difﬁe–
Hellman key exchange protocol over Fp both communicating parties have a certain
element K of Fp which is their common key. Thus element K has the same bit length as p
and thus is n bits long. The size of n is chosen to make this protocol secure (nowadays, at
least nX512). However, after the key is established both parties need to switch to a
private key cryptosystem and therefore need to derive a much shorter bit string k from K
(nowadays around 80 bits). Typically some hash-functions are used for this purpose but
one would prefer to have a rigorous proof that this shorter bit string k is not easier to
ﬁnd than the original key K : Results of this type are called bit security results and are of
great interest for cryptography. In particular, the results of [1,8] can be interpreted that
ﬁnding n1=2 most signiﬁcant bits of K is not easier than ﬁnding all bits of K :
A detailed survey of several other results of this type (including the RSA
cryptosystem and the discrete logarithm problem) has recently been given in [5].
Number theoretic aspects of this problem, including some links to bounds of
exponential sums in ﬁnite ﬁelds, are surveyed in [18,19]. Several more recent results
on bit security of various cryptographic functions can be found in [6,10,14–17].
Verheul [22] among several other results, considers a similar problem for the Difﬁe–
Hellman key in arbitrary ﬁnite ﬁelds. However instead of studying the security of the
most signiﬁcant bits the paper [22] deals with the security of values of sparse polynomials
at the values of the Difﬁe–Hellman keys. More precisely, let us ﬁx an element gAFq and a
polynomial FðXÞAFq½X : It has been shown in [22], under certain natural conditions,
that if we are given an oracle which for each pair ðgx; gyÞ with some integers x and y
returns the value of FðgxyÞ; then this oracle can be used to construct a polynomial time
algorithm to compute the Difﬁe–Hellman key gxy: We remark that polynomials F can be
of very large degree (thus directly solving the equation FðgxyÞ ¼ A is not feasible) but
contain a reasonably small number of monomials. The result has been motivated by
applications to the proof of security of a certain new cryptosystem, see [2,11–13,22].
Here we obtain a generalization of Theorem 24 of [22] to the ‘‘unreliable’’ case,
when oracle returns the result only for a certain very small fraction of inputs and
returns an error message for other inputs.
2. Preparations
The following estimate on the number of zeros of sparse polynomials is a version
of the similar result from [3,4,20].
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Lemma 1. For rX2 elements a1;y; arAFq and integers t1;y; trAZ let us denote by Q
the number of solutions of the equation
Xr
i¼1
aiz
ti ¼ 0; zAFq:
Then
Qp3ðq  1Þ11=ðr1Þd1=ðr1Þ;
where
d ¼ min
1pipr
max
jai
gcdðtj  ti; q  1Þ:
Proof. It has been shown in Lemma 7 of [3] (see also Lemma 4 of [4] and Lemma 2.6
of [20]) that
Qp2 q  1
JL1=ðr1Þn 1
 
where L ¼ ðq  1Þ=d: If Lp3r1 then
Qpq  1p3ðq  1ÞL1=ðr1ÞXq4Q:
Otherwise JL1=ðr1Þn 1X2L1=ðr1Þ=3 and the result follows. &
Let us ﬁx an element WAFq of multiplicative order t:
Lemma 2. For mX2 elements a1;y; amAFq and integers e1;y; em we denote by W
the number of solutions of the equation
Xm
i¼1
aiW
eiu ¼ 0; uA½0; t  1:
Then the bound
Wp3t11=ðm1ÞD1=ðm1Þ;
holds, where
D ¼ min
1pipm
max
jai
gcdðej  ei; tÞ:
Proof. We write W ¼ gðq1Þ=t where g is a primitive root of Fq and note that each
solution uA½0; t  1 of the previous exponential equation gives rise to ðq  1Þ=t
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distinct solutions
zj ¼ guþtj; j ¼ 0;y; ðq  1Þ=t  1;
of the equation
Xm
i¼1
aiz
ti ¼ 0; zAFq;
where tj ¼ ejðq  1Þ=t: Remarking that
gcdðtj  ti; q  1Þ ¼ q  1
t
gcdðej  ei; tÞ;
from Lemma 1 we obtain that
Wp3 t
q  1 ðq  1Þ
11=ðm1Þ q  1
t
D
 1=ðm1Þ
¼ 3t11=ðm1ÞD1=ðm1Þ
as claimed. &
3. Security of polynomial transformations of the Difﬁe–Hellman key
Let gAFq be an element of multiplicative order t:
As in [22] we consider an m-sparse polynomial
FðX Þ ¼
Xm
i¼1
ciX
eiAFq½X ; ð1Þ
where c1;y; cmAFq and e1;y; em are pairwise distinct modulo t:
Let 0oep1: Assume that we are given an oracle OF ;e such that for every
xA½0; t  1; given the values of gx and gy; it returns FðgxyÞ for at least et values of
yA½0; t  1 and returns an error message for other values of yA½0; t  1:
The case e ¼ 1; that is, the case of a ‘‘noise-free’’ oracle has been considered in [22].
We are ready to prove the main result. For simplicity we assume that t is a prime
number, although analogues of our result hold for composite t as well. Nevertheless
this case allows us to simplify some arguments and it is also one of the most
practically important cases, see [2,11–13,22].
Theorem 3. Let t be prime, mX2 and let an m-sparse polynomial F be given by (1).
Assume that
1XeX6t1=ðm1Þ:
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Given an oracle OF ;e; there exists a probabilistic algorithm which given gx and gy makes
the expected number of at most 2me1 calls of the oracle OF ;e; executes polynomial
number ðm log qÞOð1Þ arithmetic operations in Fq per each call and returns gxy for all
pairs ðx; yÞA½0; t  12:
Proof. If x ¼ 0 the result is trivial. Let us consider a pair ðx; yÞA½0; t  12 with xa0:
Let U be the set of uA½0; t  1 for which the oracle, given the values of gx and
gyþu; returns the value of FðgxðyþuÞÞ (certainly this set depends on x and y). By the
conditions of the theorem jUjXet: We also remark that if gy is known then for any
vA½0; t  1 the value of gyþv can easily be computed as well.
Put W ¼ gx: Our algorithm consists of m steps which recursively build a certain
sequence u1;y; umA½0; t  1 after which gxy can be found by solving a nonsingular
system of m linear equations in m variables over Fq: At each step the expected
number of oracle calls is at most 2e1:
At the ﬁrst step we select a sequence of elements v uniformly and independently at
random in the interval ½0; t  1 and for each of them feed gx and gyþv into the oracle
OF ;e until we ﬁnd an element uAU and thus ﬁnd the value of FðgxðyþuÞÞ:
Let us call this element u1: The expected number of oracle calls to ﬁnd such an
element is e1p2e1:
At the kth step, 2pkpm; we assume that we have already found k  1 elements
u1;y; uk1AU with
detðWeiuj Þk1i;j¼1a0: ð2Þ
We select elements v uniformly and independently at random in the interval ½0; t  1
until we ﬁnd an element ukAU such that
detðWeiuj Þki;j¼1a0: ð3Þ
We remark that if the last determinant vanishes then uk satisﬁes an equation of the
form
D1W
ekuk þ?þ DkWe1uk ¼ 0
where, by assumption (2), we have
D1 ¼ detðWeiuj Þk1i;j¼1a0:
Applying Lemma 2 we obtain that the number of elements ukAU which satisfy
condition (3) is at least
jUj  3t11=ðk1ÞXjUj  3t11=ðm1ÞX1
2
jUj:
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Thus such an element ukAU can be found in the expected number of at most 2e1
oracle calls with gx and gyþv where elements v are selected uniformly and
independently at random in the interval ½0; t  1:
More precisely, if for the chosen value of v we have
D1W
ekv þ?þ DkWe1v ¼ 0; ð4Þ
then we discard this value of v and chose another one. Otherwise, we call the oracle
OF ;e with gx and gyþv for a random vA½0; t  1: We repeat this procedure until it
returns FðgxðyþvÞÞ and denote the corresponding value by uk: Because there are at
least 0:5jUjX0:5et values of v for which (4) does not hold, the expected number of
oracle calls is at most 2e1:
Therefore, after m steps and the expected number of at most 2me1 oracle calls, we
obtain m elements u1;y; umAU with corresponding values of Aj ¼ FðWyþuj Þ for each
j ¼ 1;y; m and such that
detðWeiuj Þmi;j¼1a0:
The rest of the proof follows essentially the same arguments as the proof of
Theorem 24 of [22]. Indeed, we see from our construction that we have a nonsingular
system of linear equations
Xm
i¼1
ciW
eiujWeiy ¼ Aj ; j ¼ 1;y; m;
from which the vector ðc1We1y;y; cmWemyÞ can be found and thus we obtain the values
of ge1xy;y; gemxy: Because mX2 and t is prime, at least one of e1;y; em (which are
pairwise distinct modulo t) is relatively prime to t: Say if gcdðe1; tÞ ¼ 1 we deﬁne an
integer f1A½1; t  1 from the congruence f1e1 
 1 ðmod tÞ and compute
gxy ¼ ðge1xyÞf1 :
Remarking that the expected number of oracle calls is 2me1 and that the rest of the
algorithm can be implemented in deterministic polynomial in m log q time, we obtain
the desired result. &
4. Remarks and open questions
Let q ¼ pr: Then the trace function
TrðXÞ ¼
Xr1
i¼0
X p
i
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provides a natural example of a polynomial of form (1). This function as well as the
function
LðXÞ ¼
X
0piajpr1
X p
iþpj
have been studied in [2] (with r ¼ 6). Our results imply a stronger version of Lemma
3.1 of [2] and thus give more security assurance to the cryptosystem proposed there.
The same comment also applies to the one proposed in [11–13] XTR public key
cryptosystem which is based on a more computationally efﬁcient modiﬁcation of the
ideas of [2].
It is easy to see that making more oracle calls one can replace the oracle OF ;e with a
more natural and general oracle *OF ;e which returns the correct values of FðgxyÞ for at
least et2 pairs ðx; yÞA½0; t  12 (rather than for et values of yA½0; t  1 and each
xA½0; t  1) and an error message for other pairs ðx; yÞA½0; t  12: We brieﬂy
outline the necessary adjustments to the algorithm of Theorem 3. For xA½0; t  1; let
Mx denote the number yA½0; t  1 for which the oracle *OF ;e; given the values of gx
and gy; returns FðgxyÞ: Thus,
Xt
x¼0
MxXet2:
Let L be the number of xA½0; t  1 for which MxX0:5et: Then
Xt
x¼0
Mxp0:5etðt  LÞ þ Lt ¼ 0:5et2 þ ð1 0:5eÞLt:
Therefore
LX
e
2ð1 0:5eÞ tX0:5et:
Now we select a random uA½0; t  1 and compute gxþu: Using polynomially many
random values of vA½0; t  1 with high probability we can test whether MxþuX0:5et:
If this is not the case we select another value of u: After the expected number of
t=Lp2e1 random choices of u we ﬁnd a value with MxþuX0:5et: Now we apply the
same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 3 with gxþu and gy; recovering gðxþuÞy:
Now we can ﬁnd gxy ¼ gðxþuÞyðgyÞu:
In fact we do not even need the oracle to return the error message. It is enough to
assume that when it does not compute FðgxyÞ; it returns just a random element of Fq:
Then repeating each oracle call polynomially many times one can distinguish
between correct outputs and random outputs with overwhelming probability.
On the other hand, it would also be very important to obtain similar results for the
case where the oracle returns the correct value of FðgxyÞ for a certain portion of
inputs and returns wrong (but consistent) results for other inputs (instead of the
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error message or a random element of Fq; thus wrong outputs cannot be immediately
identiﬁed).
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